

Reconstructing Ancient History¹: Historiographical Review of the Ancient History of Korea, 1950s-2000s²

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Abstract: The ancient history of Korea has been one of the most controversial and difficult phases to incorporate into an East Asian history survey class, not only because there are indeed quite a number of contested issues, but also because very few updated materials are available in English. This essay aims to provide a comprehensive and critical overview of research on the topic of Korean ancient history in the past six decades (mainly in South Korea), so that the ancient history of Korea can be understood first within the broader frame of East Asian history, and then in relation to the intellectual and ideological evolution which has significantly impacted historical interpretations in South Korea.

Keywords ancient history; nationalism; historiography; historical disputes; history textbook; founder myth

I. INTRODUCTION

The ancient history of Korea has been one of the most controversial periods, as the scarcity and ambiguity of historical records as well as various interpretations generated by different scholars have made this an arena replete with complexity and disputes. For a long time, research on ancient history remained a puzzle of fragmentary and sometimes contradictory historical records. Moreover, understandings of Korean ancient history underwent a drastic change in the late nineteenth century, in close relation to Korea's political situation and the rise of nationalism. During the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945), Korean nationalist historians focused their attention on ancient Korea as a way of raising the national consciousness. This political inclination toward research on ancient history was carried over to the postwar period after Korea's liberation from Japanese rule in 1945. Outside Korea, Japanese and Chinese historians also became interested in ancient Korean history for its relevance to their own histories.

The controversial connection between ancient history and political legitimacy, combined with the scarcity of English publications on these subjects, makes it hard to incorporate Korea's ancient history in East Asia survey classes.³ This paper traces the historiographical evolution of research on ancient history in South Korea, with emphasis on the most controversial issues and their transformation in relation to ideology and new archaeological findings. Because it appears that all possible written documents have already been found and examined, new findings are limited to what is uncovered by ongoing archaeological studies. Despite decades of effort, the ancient history of Korea is still mostly myth and enigma; nonetheless, studies on ancient history continue to flourish, driven by the enthusiasm of scholars who have embraced their variety and complexity for the past sixty years.

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II. MAJOR ISSUES

A. THE ORIGIN OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE AND CIVILIZATION

Tracing the origin of East Asian people and civilization has been crucial not only in the field of national history, but also in studies of interstate relationships. Since the 1950s, most South Korean scholars have leaned toward a so-called migration hypothesis about the origin of the Korean people. The earliest residents of the Korean Peninsula are said to have been Paleo-Asiatic people who were widely spread across Eurasia, northern China, and the Korean Peninsula. They used cord-patterned pottery and cherished shamanistic and animistic beliefs. This is the period that is tied to the Korean founder myth of Tan'gun. These earliest Paleo-Asiatic people were absorbed and replaced by newly arriving Altai-Tungus people who then evolved into the direct ancestors of the Koreans, known as the *Ye* and *Maek* in Chinese documents.⁴

This widely accepted northern origin hypothesis reflected Korean scholars' effort to overcome Japanese-sponsored scholarship that flourished during the colonial period, a historiography heavily weighted toward heteronomy (i.e., Korea's total reliance on foreign influences, both cultural and political, from China). Korean scholars felt more comfortable connecting prehistoric Korean civilization to the northern areas, such as Altai and Siberia, while identifying Chinese influence as having begun as late as possible (after the third century BCE). Paleo-Asiatic and Tungus were terms used to indicate ancient residents of Altai and Siberia based on Russian ethnographical investigations carried out in the eighteenth century. However, it was the Japanese colonial historian Shiratori Kurakichi (1865-1942) who first claimed that the *Ye* and *Maek* belonged to the Tungus people—a theory aimed at making it seem that the Koreans and Japanese had common ancestors.⁵ These problematic concepts of ethnicity were transmitted from Russian to Japanese scholars, and then accepted by Korean scholars during the colonial period. This intellectual heritage burdens Korean scholars who are still not completely free from politically driven Japanese historiography.⁶ Scholars are still debating the migration hypothesis (from Altai and Siberia to the Korean Peninsula) versus an indigenous origin of early residents in the Korean Peninsula, while continuing to search for better archaeological evidence.

B. KO CHOSŎN OR THE THREE CHOSŎN: TAN'GUN, KIJA (C. JIZI), AND WIMAN (C. WEIMAN)

1) TAN'GUN: FROM MYTH TO A HISTORICAL FIGURE

Among the unresolved issues regarding the early history of Korea, the most controversial is the historical lineage of the Three Chosŏn, especially Tan'gun Chosŏn. In a desperate effort to validate an authentic national ancestor, Korean scholars have spared no effort to learn about Tan'gun, the legendary ancestor of the Korean people and putative founder of the first Korean state, called Ko Chosŏn. Scholars are still far from any consensus on Ko Chosŏn. The debate includes whether Ko Chosŏn was centered in the Liaodong area in China or in P'yŏngyang or whether, according to the migration hypothesis, it was first in Liaodong and then moved to P'yŏngyang around the third century BCE.⁷ Many South Korean scholars commonly agreed upon the migration hypothesis in the 1990s, though it was recently challenged by a young scholar who argued that the center of Ko Chosŏn was always located in the northwestern part of the Korean Peninsula.⁸

Tan'gun has long maintained unsurpassable significance in Korean history and consciousness. Since the summit meeting between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong Il in 2000 and

the raising of hopes for Korean re-unification, the legend of Tan'gun as a common ancestor has become a starting point for national healing. There have been a number of unprecedented symposiums and events held in North and South Korea for commemorating Tan'gun in the past twelve years, which contributed to the creation of a new term, *Tan'gun minjok chu'ui* or Tan'gun nationalism,⁹ indicating a new phase of Korean nationalism with emphasis on the symbolic meaning of Tan'gun.¹⁰

More recently, the South Korean Ministry of Education decided to make two major revisions in new high school history textbooks. The first is relocating the Tan'gun myth to the historical era, and the second is revising the dates of the Korean Bronze Age to start in 2000 BCE, adding an additional millennium to Korean history. According to one authority, the revisions were made because "there has been criticism from both political and academic spheres, pointing out that the overall treatment of Tan'gun Chosŏn was *too passive*....and upon this request, we plan to make *a more proactive narrative* about our ancient history [author's translation and italics]."¹¹

An additional complication is the rising popularity of so-called amateur historians in South Korea since the 1960s. They have attempted to reconstruct a glorious national history through emotional and arbitrary interpretations of historical documents, replete with ultra-nationalism and irredentism. Believing that the idea of a powerful ancient empire is crucial to Korean national unity and identity, they have contended that the territory of Ko Chosŏn reached as far as the east coast of mainland China and the Maritime Provinces of Russia, in addition to Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula.¹² With the support of the former military government of South Korea, these amateur historians even made the issue of ancient history the subject of a hearing in the Korean National Assembly in 1981 and requested fundamental changes to the narrative of Ko Chosŏn history in textbooks. It is ironic that despite the amateur historians' patriotic hostility toward Communism, their understanding of the country's ancient history is similar to the official stance of North Korea: both argue for a glorious, powerful, and uninterrupted ancient history that includes territory far beyond the normally recognized national boundaries.

2) *KIJA AND KIJA CHOSŎN:*

In contrast to Tan'gun, which shifted from the realm of myth to historical reality, the long-venerated authenticity of Kija has been repeatedly challenged in the twentieth century. Until the late eighteenth century, Kija was highly respected as a most righteous gentleman who brought advanced Chinese civilization to Korea. Indeed, the Kija story enabled the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392-1910) literati to claim with pride that they were the only remaining carriers of civilization in East Asia after the Manchu people established the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) in China proper. However, whatever pride there was in being Kija's descendants waned with the weakening of China after the late nineteenth century.¹³

After decades of historical investigation, the essential questions about Kija and his regime in Korea, known as Kija Chosŏn, remain. Was Kija a real figure? Did he come to the Korean Peninsula? Did he establish Kija Chosŏn? Where was Kija Chosŏn located? Setting Tan'gun as the starting point of Korean history, contemporary Korean scholars agree that Kija's emigration to the Korean Peninsula was a fabrication first introduced by Chinese historians during the Han dynasty (second century BCE), and later was uncritically accepted and internalized by Koryŏ and Chosŏn literati.

However, scholars have varied in their alternative interpretations. Some argue that Kija Chosŏn should be renamed as Hanssi Chosŏn¹⁴ or Yemaek Chosŏn,¹⁵ while some assign Kija Chosŏn to areas outside of the Korean Peninsula;¹⁶ some contend that Kija Chosŏn

was just one of numerous coexisting primitive states founded by Chinese refugees.¹⁷ Very few scholars still admit Kija's migration to the Korean Peninsula, but by arguing that Kija belongs to *Tongi* or the Eastern Barbarians (hence, ancient Koreans), Kija Chosŏn has therefore been redeemed as an ancient Korean state.¹⁸

3) WIMAN: A CHINESE EXILE OR KOREAN PATRIOT?

Wiman is one of the most controversial figures in Korean history.¹⁹ There have been numerous attempts to reinterpret Tan'gun and Kija Chosŏn since the 1950s, yet almost all of them were more or less variations that had already appeared from the late Chosŏn period to the colonial period. Interestingly, the most drastic change that occurred during the postwar era was about Wiman Chosŏn.

For almost two thousand years after the Wiman Chosŏn period, no Korean historian had ever questioned that Wiman was a member of the Yan people (and thus a Chinese). From the Korean side, Wiman was first mentioned in *Samguk yusa* or the *Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms*, which was written by Iryŏn (1206-1289 C.E.) and largely quoted from Chinese sources regarding Wiman. Hence, Iryŏn was the first to propose a Three Chosŏn framework, and Wiman Chosŏn was included in the lineage of Ko Chosŏn along with Tan'gun and Kija Chosŏn. However, according to the story, Wiman usurped the throne after betraying King Kijun, the legitimate ruler of Kija Chosŏn, and was thus an illegitimate ruler. Wiman is therefore condemned, and for centuries his role has been minimized or intentionally ignored.

The most drastic change in interpretations of Wiman was proposed by Yi Pyŏngdo (1896-1989), one of the most prominent historians in South Korea in the twentieth century. Calling special attention to Wiman's topknot hairdo and the barbarian dress that he wore when he fled to Korea, Wiman's insistence that Chosŏn be the title of his new state, and Wiman Chosŏn's obstinate resistance against the Han invasion, Yi Pyŏngdo concluded that Wiman was actually a descendant of Ko Chosŏn.²⁰

It is interesting to note that North Korean scholars have concurred with Yi's strikingly new interpretations.²¹ Although it is difficult to find any evidence of communication between scholars in North and South Korea in the 1950s and 1960s, it seemed that the national division did not prevent them from reaching similar interpretations on Wiman.²² Yi Pyŏngdo's revisionist view was widely accepted among South Korean scholars due to Yi's academic reputation and his theory's promising implications.²³ Believing that Wiman was of Korean descent, archaeologists have attempted to bring Wiman Chosŏn into the discussion of state formation in early Korea.²⁴ Contrary to the Japanese scholarship, which uses Wiman Chosŏn as one of the most substantial pieces of evidence for affirming the heteronomous nature of Korean history, the newly invented ethnicity of Wiman makes for a complete reversal. Thus, Wiman Chosŏn has been transformed into a legitimate phase among Korean ancient states, and Wiman himself has been resurrected as a Korean national hero who led his fellow compatriots in fighting against Chinese domination.²⁵ This is despite the fact that the details of Wiman's hairdo and dress, depicted by Sima Qian, were not based on his first-hand observation and thus are dubious as evidence of Wiman's actual ethnicity.

C. DISPUTES OVER FOREIGN INTERVENTION

1) THE FOUR HAN COMMANDARIES

Nangnang (*C. Lelang*) Commandery, established after Wiman Chosŏn collapsed after the invasion of the Han Emperor Wudi's troops, lasted from 108 BCE to 313 CE in the

P'yöngyang area. Post-1945 Korean scholars intentionally avoided the issue of Nangnang because of its nature as a Han colony and the exceptional attention paid to it by Japanese colonial scholars for purposes of making claims about the innate heteronomy of Koreans.²⁶ Nonetheless, the large amount of Nangnang-related archaeological data excavated between the end of the colonial period and the 1990s needs to be addressed in order to understand the ancient history of Korea. Although it has long been held that Nangnang was located in the P'yöngyang area, some extreme nationalist scholars have contended that it was located as far away as to the west of the Liao River in China. They base this on an attribution of Nangnang relics excavated around the P'yöngyang area to an indigenous Korean state named *Nangnangguk*, or the State of Nangnang, which is believed totally irrelevant to the Han Lelang Commandery.²⁷

The issue of the Nangnang Commandery along with the other three Han Commanderies was crucial not only to the history of Korea, but also for the overall picture of premodern East Asian history. There is little written and affirmed archaeological evidence about the other two Han Commanderies, i.e., Chinbön (C. *Zhenfan*) and Imdun (C. *Lintun*), mainly because these two commanderies lasted for a brief twenty-five years. The fourth one, the Hyöndo (C. *Xuantu*) Commandery, has also been neglected for a long time because it moved westward twice and remained outside of the Korean Peninsula thereafter. However, the Hyöndo Commandery was pivotal because of its relationship with the later Koguryö Kingdom (C. *Gaogouli*, 37 BCE?-668 CE). According to *Hanshu* or *The Historical Record of the Han Dynasty*, "After the Emperor Wu of the Han quashed Chaoxian, he made Gaogouli a county subject to Xuantu Commandery. Emperor Wu also invested musicians to Gaogouli."²⁸ This further contributed to the issues of Koguryö's historical sovereignty that are now the subject of passionate debate between Chinese and Korean scholars. Some Chinese scholars insisted that because of the subjugation of Gaogouli to the Han Xuantu Commandery, Gaogouli was always a Chinese vassal state.²⁹ In contrast, Korean scholars would emphasize the independent formation of the Koguryö state and the stiff resistance raised by Koguryö against the expansion and invasion of the Chinese dynasties over the centuries. Despite its demise in 668, Koguryö continues to be remembered as one of the strongest and most prosperous phases of Korean history, especially in the sense of military strength and territorial scope.

The most recent discovery of wooden tablets in North Korea shed new light on the history of Nangnang and Ko Chosön. Some of these wooden tablets were inscribed with census information of the Nangnang Commandery, indicating that the Nangnang Commandery consisted of twenty-five counties and had a population of 280,561 in 45 BCE.³⁰ This is a crucial breakthrough in deciphering not only the history of Nangnang, but also of Ko Chosön. Opinions on the territorial size of Ko Chosön have ranged from viewing it as a huge ancient empire to a small entity on the northwestern Korean Peninsula. Now supported with census documents from Nangnang, scholars have projected the possible size of population of Ko Chosön and drawn the conclusion that Ko Chosön was a chiefdom at an early stage of state formation with a small population.³¹

2) *Imna* (J. *MIMANA*)

The issue of Imna, said to have been located on the southeastern coast of the Korean Peninsula in the fourth century CE, has been utilized for legitimizing Japan's colonization of Korea since the 1890s. Because of the limited and ambivalent written sources regarding Imna, the late nineteenth-century rediscovery of the King Kwanggaet'o (r. 391-413 CE) stele, erected in 414 C.E., attracted tremendous political and academic attention. Japanese

scholars demonstrated intense interest in this stele, which they believed to be the key not only for exploring the early history of Japan, but also the interstate relationships between Japan and Korea. This was also the reason that the research of the stele inscription garnered support from the Japanese Ministry of Army. Indeed, the founder of Japanese modern historiography, Shiratori Kurakichi, once even proposed to smuggle the entire stele to Japan.³²

The importance of this stele centered on a fourteen-character sentence that described the interstate relationships among the Three Kingdoms in the Korean Peninsula and Japan. Based on the conventional reading by Japanese scholars, it reads that “*Wa* (Japan) came across the sea and defeated Paekche, and Paekche and Silla have been the subjects of Japan ever since.” Japanese scholars insisted that *Wa* actively intervened and even dominated interstate relationships in Northeast Asia. In other words, *Wa* came to the Korean Peninsula under the request of Paekche, confronted Koguryō, and invaded Silla. As a result, some Japanese scholars claimed this stele to be the most substantial evidence for the actual existence of Imna Colony and the dominance of Japan over the southeastern part of Korea.

The interpretation of this crucial sentence and some particular characters in it has been hotly debated among Japanese and Korean historians. Some Korean scholars have suspected a conspiracy of applying lime onto the stele so that the overall meaning would be beneficial to Japan, though a Chinese scholar later affirmed that the lime was applied by local Chinese workers in order to produce rubbings with readable quality.³³ Due to its complexity and crucial implication, it is not surprising that Imna has been one of the primary targets for Korean historians since the 1950s. The still controversial issues are about whether Imna really existed, where it was located, and the nature of this entity.

The debate over Imna continues.³⁴ Although the colonial-era theories were consciously eroded, many postwar Japanese scholars still believe in the existence of a Japanese administration/outpost in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula. Some Japanese scholars suggested a much later formation of the Imna, in 429 CE or as late as around 530 CE, compared to the early hypothesis of 369 CE.³⁵ There were also new interpretations of the nature of Imna by arguing that Imna was more of a diplomatic or commercial station. Some Korea scholars further suggested that instead of *Wa* Japan, it was Paekche that had suzerain power over Imna. According to this theory, the ruler of Imna was later mistakenly recorded as Japanese, because the *Nihon shoki* or the *Historical Record of Japan* was written by Paekche refugees who escaped to Japan after the demise of the Paekche Kingdom in 660 CE and consequently presented all Paekche-related records with Japanese protagonists.³⁶ More recently, scholars called for understanding Imna in the context of Kaya history, and proposed that Imna was a branch office of Paekche for securing the trade route to Japan as well as an intelligence outpost.

The issue of Imna has continually been spotlighted, especially when there was a discovery of archaeological sites related to both the Korean and Japanese sides. Interestingly, the fundamental question is always about the authenticity of Imna and the chronology of cultural relics—in other words, which side of the strait created and/or possessed certain items first. The dilemma of archaeology can be perceived in the opposite interpretations of the archaeological data: the Japanese scholars used it to affirm the existence of a Japanese colony in Korea, while the Korean scholars used it to prove the Korean origin of the early Japanese culture and/or royal lineage. It is not surprising that Japanese Emperor Akihito’s comment on the Paekche origin of the maternal side of the Japanese royal lineage aroused opposite reactions in the Japanese and Korean media in 2001.³⁷ The Japanese media allocated minimum coverage, while the Korean newspapers were replete with overjoyed tones claiming that the Japanese emperor had finally admitted historical truth.³⁸

III. CONCLUSION

With the prevalence of modern nationalism, colonialism, and imperialism in the twentieth century, the interpretation of ancient history underwent tremendous changes which can be observed, for example, in the way history textbooks have been revised in South Korea. Tan'gun and Tan'gun Chosŏn were transformed from myth to historical fact and, by using the vague term *seryŏk pŏmwi*, or the scope of power, the map of Ko Chosŏn was made to cover a wide range from Northeast China to the Korean Peninsula. Despite the prominence of Kija in Korean history until the late nineteenth century, Kija and Kija Chosŏn completely disappeared from the historical lineage of Korean history. Starting from Tan'gun, the textbook implied a continuity of the Tan'gun lineage in the following period, which was conventionally named the Kija Chosŏn.

Many South Korean scholars are sympathetic to the new view of Wiman as a former member of Ko Chosŏn. However, due to the prominence of historical records describing Wiman as Yan Chinese, the textbook revisions made a compromise between the previous definition of Wiman as a Han refugee and Yi Pyŏngdo's new definition of Wiman's ethnicity by vaguely depicting Wiman's origin as follows:

at the end of the third century BCE, there were many migrants to Chosŏn because of the chaotic transition from the Qin to the Han Dynasty. *There was a man named Wiman* among them who came with many followers, and the *King of Ko Chosŏn* [here the textbook uses Ko Chosŏn to avoid Kija Chosŏn] enfeoffed him with the western frontier for defense. However, Wiman later used military force to drive King Chun [again, the textbook uses King Chun instead of King Kijun for the same purpose of avoiding Kija Chosŏn] out and made himself king. He further conquered the surrounding areas and his power prevailed [author's italics].³⁹

The nature and location of the Han Commanderies and Imna became the most contested issues since the late nineteenth century, thanks to their potential implications for the formation of a new East Asian order. Despite the complexity, importance, and sensitivity of these issues, both the Han Commanderies and Imna completely disappeared from the current history textbooks in South Korea.⁴⁰ Although these are ongoing debates and there is room for different and/or opposite interpretations, it seems that revisionist views are still far from sufficient in counteracting the image of the Han Commanderies and Imna as foreign colonies located in the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, without any reference to the installation of the Four Han Commanderies, the textbook revisions emphasized Korean resistance against foreign power and implied the eventual victory of the Korean nation: "Though the Han dynasty extended their power to a certain portion of the former Ko Chosŏn territory, our nation resisted and was finally successful at driving them [Han troops] out."⁴¹

Nationalist historiography is still prevalent among many Korean historians because of its contribution to counteracting Japanese colonialism and racism during the colonial period. With the disintegration of the Cold War framework and increasing cultural, economic, and political interactions among countries, studies of ancient history have become more complicated. This is because of the still valid burden of affirming a national essence/identity despite the ambivalent boundaries among "national" cultures, especially regarding the early history of East Asia. As a result, the so-called "history wars" have been frequently in the mass media spotlight, drawing tremendous and unprecedented attention not only from academics but also from the general public, and historians have often condemned their counterparts from other countries for "distorting history." Noticing the dilemma of national history and globalization, some contemporary Korean historians have proposed *yŏllin*

minjok chuüi or “Open Nationalism,”⁴² attempting to reach a compromise between the felt need for strengthening nationalism in the local context and the overall trend of globalization, though it is unclear how to implement the “Open Nationalism” in the study of ancient history.

NOTES

1. According to common periodization in South Korea, the term “ancient history” refers to the beginning of history through the end of the Unified Silla period in 935. This paper focuses on the first stage of ancient history, and leaves the Three Kingdoms, Puyö, Samhan, Kaya, the Unified Silla, and the Parhae periods for a future opportunity.
2. A part of this essay is revised from the author’s unpublished dissertation, chapter 3, “Ancient History Reinvented: Another Arena for Competing for National Prestige and Political Legitimacy.” See Stella Xu, “That Glorious Ancient History of Our Nation: The contested re-readings of ‘Korea’ in early Chinese historical records and their legacy on the formation of Korean-ness” (PhD diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 2007), 188-233.
3. Korea Institute at Harvard University started publishing a journal titled *Early Korea* to promote research on early Korean history and archaeology. There are two volumes available: volume one published in 2008 and volume two in 2009.
4. Kim Jung-bae, *Han’guk minjok munhwa üi kiwön* (Seoul: Koryö taehakkyo chulp’anbu, 1973).
5. Shiratori Kurakichi, *Shiratori Kurakichi zenshü* 4 (Tökyö: Iwanami Shoten, 1969), 537-38.
6. For a critique of Korean scholars’ migration hypothesis and the paradoxical legacy of Japanese colonial scholarship, see Hyung Il Pai, *Constructing ‘Korean’ Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asian Center, 2000), chapters 1 and 2.
7. No T’aedon, “Ko Chosön chungsimji üi pyönchön e taehan yön’gu,” in *Tan’gun kwa Ko Chosönsa* (Seoul: Sagyechöl, 2002), 75.
8. Song Hojöng, *Han’guk kodaesa sok üi Ko Chosön sa* (Seoul: P’urün yöksa, 2003), 471.
9. This was first proposed by Chöng Yönghun. See Chöng Yönghun, “Han’guksa sok üi esö ‘Tan’gun minjok chuüi wa kü chöngch’ijök songkyök,” *Han’guk chöngch’ihak hoebo* 28 vol. 2 (1994), 34.
10. On the other hand, the worship of Tan’gun also became a matter of dispute for Korean Christians. The South Korean government attempted to establish a Tan’gun statue in some elementary and middle schools; however, this has long been opposed by Korean Christian organizations, and some Tan’gun statues were severely damaged by radical Christians.
11. Yun Tuhyön, “Ko Chosön, sinhwa esö yöksa ro,” *Munhwa ilbo*, February 23, 2007. Interview with Chang Tökjin, the chief director of Committee for National History Compilation. See <http://kr.news.yahoo.com/service/news/shellview.htm?linkid=3&articleid=2007022313465651516&newssetid=746> (accessed Feb. 24, 2007) {{Citation broken[date=June 2012]}}.
12. An Hosang, *The Ancient History of the Korea-Dong-I race: The Korea-Dong-I Race, Creator of East Asian Culture* (Seoul: Institute of Baedal Culture, 1974).
13. Han Yong-u, “Kija Worship in the Koryö and Early Yi Dynasties: A Cultural Symbol in the Relationship between Korea and China,” in *The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea*, Wm. Theodore de Bary and JaHyun Kim Haboush, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
14. Yi Pyöngdo, “Kija Chosön üi chöngchë wa sowi Kija p’al’jogyo e taehan singoch’al,” *Han’guk kodaesa yön’gu* (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1976).
15. Kim Jung-bae, *Han’guk minjok munhwa üi kiwön* (Seoul: Koryö taehakkyo chulp’anbu, 1973).
16. Shim Jae-Hoon, “A New Understanding of Kija Chosön as a Historical Anachronism,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 62 no. 2 (December 2002): 271-305.
17. Yun Naehyön, “Kija sin’go,” *Han’guk kodaesa sillon* (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1986), 239.
18. Chön Kwan’u, *Ko Chosön sa Samhan sa yön’gu* (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1989), 37-89.
19. Wiman was trusted and favored by King Kijun, and was asked to defend the northwestern border of Chosön. However, Wiman later usurped the power and drove King Kijun out of P’yöngyang, and established Wiman Chosön around 194 BCE.
20. Yi Pyöngdo, *Han’guk kodaesa yön’gu* (Seoul: Pagyöngsa, 1976), 65-94.
21. Li Chilin, *Ko Chosön yön’gu* (P’yöngyang: Kwahak ch’ulp’ansa, 1963), 362-65.
22. North Korean scholars completely denied Kija’s migration to the Korean Peninsula or the existence of Kija Chosön on the Korean Peninsula; therefore, Ko Chosön is synonymous with Tan’gun Chosön. Among South Korean scholars, Ko Chosön can refer to Tan’gun and Kija Chosön and sometimes even include Wiman Chosön.
23. It was Kim Han’gyu who first appealed for a reconsideration of Yi Pyöngdo’s opinion in the 1980s, contending that Wiman’s hairdo was not unique to “Koreans” but was also widely used in the Southern Yue area of China, and that the Southern Yue also used the same state title after Han exiles took power. See Kim Han’gyu, “Wiman Chosön kwangye chungguk chük saryo e taehan chae köm’tö,” *Pusak yödae nonmunjip* 8 (1980): 132-36.
24. Chöe Mongnyong, “The Trade System of the Wiman State,” *Asian and Pacific Quarterly of Cultural and Social Affairs* 15 no. 3 (Autumn 1983): 30-37.

25. The transformation of Wiman into a national hero of Korea is similar to the reputation of Zhao Tuo in Vietnamese national history.
26. Regarding historiography on Lelang, see Pai Hyung Il, *Constructing "Korean" Origins: a Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000). See also, Yi Söngsi, "Tong'asia esö üi nangang—kwaje wa pangpöb e taehan siron," *Han'guk kodaesa yöngu* 34 (2004): 5-18.
27. Yun Naehyon, *Han'guk kodaesa sillon* (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1986), 340.
28. *Hanshu* 85: 2813.
29. Ma Dazheng et al, *Gudai Zhongguo Gaogouli lishi xulun* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), 61.
30. Son Yöngjong, "Rangnanggun nambu chiyök üi wich'i—Rangnanggun ch'owön hyönbyöl chögu daso t'onggye charyo rül chungsim üro," *Ryöksa kwahak* 198 (2006): 30-33.
31. Jung-bae Kim projects that Ko Chosön's population was 56,297 in 200 BCE, and later had grown to 113,836 in 108 BCE when Wiman Chosön collapsed. See Jung-bae Kim, *Ko Chosön e Taehan Saeroun Haesök (New Interpretations on Ancient Chosön)* (Seoul: Korea University Press, 2010).
32. Geng Tiehua, *Haotaiwang bei yiqina wubai bashi nian ji* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), 34-35.
33. Wang Jiaqun, *Haotaiwangbei yanjiu* (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1984). Yi Söngsi, *Mandüröjin koda: kündae kungmin kukka üi Tong Asia iyagi* (Seoul: Samin, 2001), 49.
34. Suematsu Yasukazu, *Mimana köböshi* (Tökyö, Öyashima Shuppan Kabushiki Kaisha, 1949).
35. Yamao Yukihisa, *Kodai no Nitchö kankei* (Tökyö: Hanawa Shobö, 1989). Suzuki Hideo, *Kodai no Wakoku to Chösen shokoku* (Tökyö : Aoki Shoten, 1996).
36. Kim Hyönggu, *Imna Ilbonbu yöngu: Hanbando nambu kyöngyöngnon pip'an* (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1993).
37. An interview in December, 2001. See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T7H98orIMbc&feature=related> (accessed Jan 17, 2012)
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39. National History Compilation Committee, *National History* (Seoul: Middle School National History Textbook, 1990), 15.
40. *Ibid.*, 15, 30.
41. *Ibid.*, 15-16.
42. Kang Chonghun, "chöegün Hanguksa yöngu yisösö t'al minjonchuüi üi kyönghyang e taehan pip'anjök kömtö," *Hanguk kodaesa yöngu* 52 (2008): 57-90.